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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report looks at the current state of high-speed rail (HSR) policy in the US, juxtaposing
it against international HSR experience in Asia and Europe. The aim is to identify basic
steps that need to be put in place if an HSR system is to be developed in the US. The
international review showed that countries implementing HSR had a few key, focused
reasons for developing their HSR systems. Korea and Taiwan viewed HSR as a means
to relieve congestion on both their conventional rail and road networks. Europe has used
HSR to relieve congestion on its conventional rail lines by providing additional capacity
with improved quality of service and, in some cases, to spur economic development. China
is using HSR to spur economic development, and free up capacity in its rail network for
freight trains.
The US, on the other hand, seems to be struggling to justify the need for HSR. Public
statements of the current president, his vice president (an avid train enthusiast), and
the secretary of transportation indicate the executive branch believes HSR needs to
be integrated into the mix of transportation options for the US going forward. However,
some of the key rationales for HSR in Europe and Asia do not make a strong case in
the US situation. For example, highway congestion for intercity travel is not at critical
levels because of the well-developed, limited-access interstate highway system. Also, a
rail ownership structure in which freight companies own most of the rail network in the
US means there is no pressing need for government to intervene to free up capacity for
freight operations, though there is a need, in some cases, to provide more capacity for joint
operation of freight and conventional passenger trains.
The extensive development of the interstate highway network and airports makes it harder
to justify additional investment in HSR in the US. The fact that several states in the US
do not have the high-density, economically active population corridors along which HSR
systems are successful makes it politically challenging to generate support at the federal
level for funding of HSR lines.
Though congestion levels on intercity highways are not at unbearable levels most
legislators know additional capacity will be needed to support the increased demand
generated by population growth in the future. HSR will be one of the key options on the
table for addressing this need. We believe one of the reasons the US continues to lack a
firm HSR policy framework is that advocates have not developed a few key, compelling
arguments that politicians can coalesce behind to push for HSR development. In our view
on-time reliability, improved speeds (shorter travel times), and relatively greater safety of
HSR compared to other modes of travel are the strongest selling points for HSR in the US.
Other benefits of HSR that have been promoted in literature but are not fully addressed
in this report include reduced energy use, emissions, and congestion vs. other modes of
travel, and the potential to spur urban regeneration and attract commercial development
in the station areas.
HSR should be funded using a mix of grants, loans and bonds, with the mix heavily
skewed towards bonds. The bonds should be state sponsored but guaranteed by the
federal government. The benefit of using state bonds is that the states that benefit most
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from HSR pay for it, making it more palatable to states that do not have HSR projects. In
addition, state bonds lighten the burden on current taxpayers and equitably assign the
greatest share of the cost to those who will benefit most: future generations.
At the federal level, a key agency needs to be designated. Though Amtrak appears to
be advocating for that role, the Federal Railroad Administration appears to be the best
suited to manage an HSR program, especially as it is likely to be federally funded. A
dedicated funding source is needed so private capital and stakeholders can commit to
the HSR program. Federal government needs to move quickly to develop regulations and
specifications for HSR design and construction, as the different performance characteristics
make them incompatible with the current specifications for rail in the US.
States also have a role to play. Given the massive amount of investment involved, most
HSR projects will need some form of political support. States must have a well-thoughtout plan and a dedicated position (or body) that will work with the various legislative and
political arms of government to build and sustain support for their projects through the
development and construction phase. A team that can work closely with legislators will
help avoid the rollercoaster rides other state projects have experienced. States that decide
to embark on HSR should make sure there is formal legislation in place. States should
incorporate private-public partnerships into their development plans as early as possible.
A huge issue facing the nascent HSR industry is the lack of HSR expertise in the US.
The Mineta Transportation Institute – in collaboration with the California High-Speed Rail
Authority, the California State University system, and several private and public agencies
– has begun work on the issue. The federal government needs to quickly begin to focus
on developing educational and training centers to build up the HSR workforce capacity in
the US.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has had a long-running interest in high-speed rail (HSR). A year
after Japan launched its now-famous Shinkansen bullet train in 1964, the US Congress
authorized $90 million under the High Speed Ground Transportation Act to develop and
demonstrate HSR technologies.1 Europe and several countries in Asia followed Japan’s
lead and introduced their own HSR trains in the 1980s. Europe now has more than five
thousand miles of HSR lines, while Asia has more than six thousand. By contrast, the
closest the US has to an HSR project (by the end of 2011) is Amtrak’s Northeast corridor
Acela Express – a high-speed train running on rail tracks that restrict the train’s 150-milesper-hour maximum speed to an average of about 84 miles per hour.
The current Administration has aggressively advocated for HSR in the US. President
Obama repeatedly raised the issue during his 2008 Presidential election campaign. After
entering office, he was quick to set aside $8 billion for HSR in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act2 (ARRA) that was passed during the economic recession in 2009.
The $8 billion commitment may appear to be a drop in the bucket when one considers
the estimate of more than $500 billion3 that may be needed to build out the ten federally
designated HSR corridors in the US. However, the $8 billion is significant, given it is
the only explicit and dedicated funding for construction of actual HSR to date. Prior to
that, the only HSR-related funding was $5 million set aside in the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA)4 for projects to eliminate hazards at railwayhighway crossings.
Though the current steps appear laudable, to date the US has no clear-cut policy on HSR
development. Current efforts are very ad hoc at both the federal and state levels and lack
clearly defined goals. Given that HSR projects are multibillion-dollar initiatives that require
substantial lead times from planning through completion, a more structured and long-term
policy framework with clearly defined goals and a stable source of funding is needed.
This report looks at the current state of US HSR policy against the backdrop of international
HSR experience, mainly in Asia and Europe. The focus of this report is not to address the
question of whether or not HSR is needed in the US; much has been published on both
sides of that issue, and that debate that will continue even if HSR projects are built. The
focus is rather on what needs to be done if HSR is to succeed in the US.
The aim is to identify some of the basic structures that need to be put in place in developing
an HSR system for the US. The next chapter is a review of existing US HSR projects.
Chapter III reviews HSR projects on the international front, mainly Europe and Asia. The
review identifies motivations for development of HSR projects in those countries, measures
put in place to ensure the projects were successful, and costs and benefits derived from
implementing HSR. Chapter III looks at the broad lessons from the international experience.
Chapter IV and V use the findings as a basis for outlining policies and strategies the
US government should pursue to build a more solid HSR policy framework. We provide
specific recommendations and identify areas where further research is needed to develop
US HSR policy.
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II. CURRENT STATE OF US HIGH-SPEED RAIL
Even though there is still a vigorous ongoing public debate about whether HSR is right
for the US, from public statements made by the current president, his vice president
(an avid train enthusiast), and the secretary of transportation, the stance of the current
administration is clear: It has decided it is necessary to integrate HSR into the mix of
transportation options for the US going forward.
This decision comes on the heels of a long trail of legislation. In 1965, Congress passed
the High Speed Ground Transportation Act, authorizing $90 million to develop and
demonstrate HSR technologies.5 Five years later, in 1970, President Nixon signed the
Passenger Rail Service Act, which created the National Rail Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak). One of Amtrak’s key roles was to take over intercity passenger rail service from
freight rail companies, which found it unprofitable.6
One of the routes to which Amtrak devoted substantial resources was the northeast corridor
(NEC), from Washington, DC to Boston. According to the Federal Railroad Administration,
by 1997 Amtrak had spent up to $3.3 billion on improvements to the northeast corridor. In
November 2000, Amtrak finally rolled out their Acela Express trains, with an inaugural trip
from Washington, DC to Boston. The Acela train is the closet the US has to a functioning
HSR. A timeline of the major HSR legislation since 1965 is shown in Figure 1.

FEDERALLY DESIGNATED HIGH-SPEED RAIL CORRIDORS
Section 1010 of the 1991 ISTEA Act7 set aside $5 million annually for elimination of hazards
at railway-highway crossings at five high-speed railway corridors, to be designated by the
Secretary of Transportation. The Act defined high-speed rail corridors as locations where
trains could attain maximum speeds of 90 miles per hour, or greater. The first five HSR
corridors were designated as a result of stipulations included in the Surface Transportation
Efficiency Acts.
Later, in June 1998, six additional corridors were authorized under the Transportation
Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21)8 leading to the current eleven designated US
HSR corridors. A list of the eleven corridors designated by the secretary of transportation,
along with their descriptions, is shown in Table 1. Figure 2 shows the spatial location of the
HSR corridors.

Figure 1. Historical Timeline of Major High-Speed Rail Legislation in the United
States
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Until recently, the Northeast Corridor, where the Acela Express operates, was not
considered a federally designated corridor, as it was funded separately under various
legislative instruments, including Northeast Corridor Improvement Project.9 In March 2011
US Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood designated it as an HSR corridor. The Secretary
also extended the scope of the California corridor to Las Vegas, Nevada, in July 2009.

Figure 2. Spatial Locations of Proposed US High-Speed Rail Corridors
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Second Batch - Six Additional Corridors

First Batch - Five Initial High-Speed Rail Corridors

Table 1.

7

Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors

Chicago
Hub
Network

Initially designated on October 15, 1992 as the Midwest corridor, it consisted of three
spokes emanating from Chicago, IL, westward to Milwaukee, WI, east to Detroit, MI,
and south to St. Louis, MO. In December 1998, the Milwaukee link was extended to
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN and a new spoke to Indianapolis, IN and Cincinnati, OH
was added. The Indianapolis/Cincinnati link has been extended through Ohio in a
closed loop running from Cincinnati to Columbus, Cleveland, and Toledo and back to
Chicago. The Indianapolis link has also been extended to Louisville, KY.

Florida
Corridor

Initially designated on October 16, 1992, runs from Miami in the south to Orlando and
westward to Tampa.

California
Corridor

Also designated October 19, 1992. Runs mainly north-south along the state, linking
the major metropolitan areas of San Diego, Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area
and Sacramento via the San Joaquin Valley. On July 2, 2009, US Transportation
Secretary Ray LaHood announced extension of the California high-speed rail
corridor to Las Vegas, Nevada.

Southeast
Corridor

Designated in October 2000 as a link between Charlotte NC, Richmond, VA, and
Washington, DC. In December 1995, it was extended all the way to Macon, GA,
passing through Greenville, SC, and Atlanta, GA. The Richmond link was also extended to Hampton Roads, VA. In December 1998, the Macon, GA, loop – passing
through Jacksonville, FL, Savannah, GA, and Columbia, SC back to Raleigh, SC –
was closed. The Southeast corridor in its final form in 1998 is better characterized
as a network. The corridor now covers six states: Florida, Georgia, South and North
Carolina, Virginia and Washington, DC.

Pacific
Northwest
Corridor

Designated in October 1992. Links Eugene, OR, to Vancouver, BC, Canada, passing
through Portland, OR, and Seattle, WA, on the way north. The corridor is 466 miles
long.

Gulf Coast
Corridor

Designated November 18, 1998. Another of the multi-state corridors, it traverses six
states: Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and New Orleans. There are
three legs originating from New Orleans, LA. The westward leg goes to Houston, TX,
the eastbound leg to Mobile, AL, with an intermediate stop in Biloxi, MS, and a third
leg runs northeast to Atlanta, with major stations in Meridian, MS, and Birmingham,
AL.

Keystone
Corridor

Designated in December 1998. A planned, multi-state corridor with the west/east link
from Pittsburg, PA through Harrisburg to Philadelphia. The north/south link starts in
Washington, DC, and runs through Baltimore, MD, Wilmington, DE, Philadelphia, PA,
Trenton and Newark, NJ, and ends in New York.

Empire
State
Corridor

Designated in December 1998. Planned to run from west to east end of New York
State, Buffalo to New York City, with stops in Rochester, Syracuse, Utica and Albany.

Northern
New
England
Corridor

Set up to connect Boston to various states in the Northwest. Boston, MA, is the
center, with connections to Portland/Auburn, VT, and Montreal, PQ Canada, Albany,
CT and New Haven, CT.

South
Central
Corridor

Designated in 2000, it is another of the multi-state corridors. The Texas link is from
San Antonio, TX, in the south, to Dallas-Ft. Worth in the north. Dallas Ft.-Worth is
then linked to Tulsa, OK and Little Rock, AK.

North-East
Corridor

In March 2012, the Transportation Secretary officially designated the existing
Northeast Corridor, from Washington, DC, to Boston, MA, a high-speed rail corridor.
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FUNDING FOR HIGH-SPEED RAIL
Despite ISTEA and earlier acts designating high-speed rail corridors, the acts did
not appropriate any funds for constructing HSR lines on the corridors. So, while the
transportation secretary was enthusiastically designating HSR corridors until 2008, the
only funding available was tied to improving safety at locations where trains crossed
highways at high speeds. The ARRA is the first time the federal government committed a
substantial amount of public funds for the construction of HSR projects in the US.
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) under the US Department of Transportation
was in charge of disbursing the ARRA HSR funds. The FRA initially disbursed the bulk
of ARRA funds to six major corridors as shown in Table 2. At the time ARRA was set up,
in 2008, California appeared to be the only state with a potentially viable HSR line after
voters endorsed a $9.95 billion state bond to fund the California High-Speed Rail Project.
The projects of the remaining states were slowly grinding to a halt due to an absence of
funding.
Interestingly, when the first round of ARRA funds was allocated, Florida raced past
California with an allocation of $1.25 billion, and, soon after, additional funds, bringing
the total to $2.4 billion. The $2.4 billion would have covered 99 percent of the estimated
construction cost for the Tampa-Orlando HSR line.
Later, the governors of Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin returned their ARRA funding saying
it represented wasteful federal government spending. The secretary of transportation
reallocated the funds to other projects. After the reallocation, Florida’s HSR, which appeared
to be the most promising HSR project, came to a screeching halt. Once again, California
ended up with the bulk of more than $3 billion in federal funds for HSR projects in the US.
As of the writing of this report (2010), only $5.8 billion dollars of the ARRA funds have
been obligated. Table 3 lists both ARRA and other federal rail-related funds (those that
can be used for high-speed-rail-related projects) that have been allocated to states at the
beginning of July 2011.*

*Assembled from data on the FRA website.
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Chicago Hub
Network

Empire State

Northeast

Keystone
Northern New
England
South Central
Gulf Coast

5

6

7

8

Chicago Hub
Network

10
11

TOTAL

2,200

California

4

9

2,344

Florida

3

0

706

451

823

300

244
570

250

400

1,133

6,900

8,203

0
0

0

0

2,353

1,321

1,955

324

485

1,250

480

620

Southeast

2

467

598

Pacific
Northwest

Corridor Name

1

No.

ARRA
Funds
($ millions)
Total

New
32

1,000

84

32

800

84

144

570

300

250

4,593

1,542

1,014

880

240

480

437

Upgraded

Miles of Track

275

1,307

727

275

275

30

1.82

1.99

0.81

1.60

0.30

2.10

1.40

3.86

1.29

1.37

$/Project
Track
Mile

Initial Funding for US High-Speed Rail Corridors
Planned

Table 2.

110

110

110

79

152

110

220

168

110

150

Speed
(mph)

Multi-state
Multi-state

3
4

5

Multi-state

Multi-state

Multi-state

Multi-state

Multi-state

3

34

Single

Multi-state

6
1

Single

Multi-state

Single

Single

Multi-state

Multi-state

Extent

1

8

1

1

4

2

States

Chicago - St. Louis
- Kansas City
Minneapolis/St.
Paul - Madison
- Milwaukee Chicago
Minnesota,
Wisconsin,
Illinois
Wisconsin DOT,
Minnesota DOT

Pontiac - Detroit Chicago

Cleveland Columbus - Dayton
- Cincinnati

Multiple Stations

Illinois, Missouri,
Kansas

Michigan,
Indiana, Illinois

Michigan DOT,
Indiana DOT,
Illinois DOT

Tampa - Orlando
San Diego - Los
Angeles - San
Francisco Bay Area
- Sacramento

Illinois DOT,
Missouri DOT

Ohio

Multiple States

Multiple States

California

Florida

Charlotte - Raleigh
- Richmond Washington, D.C.

Eugene - Portland
- Seattle Vancouver, B.C.

Oregon,
Washington,
Vancouver, B.C.
North Carolina,
Virginia,
Washington, D.C.

Main Stations

Benefiting States

Ohio DOT

Multiple States

Multiple States

Florida DOT

North Carolina
DOT, Virginia
DOT

ARRA
Awardees
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Table 3.

Disbursement of ARRA and High-Speed Rail Funds in 2009/10
Description

ARRA

CA

California High-Speed Rail +
Other State Projects

2,908,371,742

6,400,000

IL

Chicago to St. Louis: 2010
Early Construction Projects,
Englewood Flyover

1,268,310,998

1,250,000

WA

Pacific Northwest Corridor:
Service Block 2-SEA-PDX 6
RTs- ARRA Redistributed

735,458,912

NC

Piedmont/Charlotte/Raleigh

520,000,000

MD

BWI Airport Station
Improvements

69,400,000

69,400,000

FL

Tampa to Orlando:
Program Management and
Preliminary Engineering

66,660,000

66,660,000

VT

Vermonter New England
Central Railroad Route
Improvements

50,000,000

CT

New Haven to Hartford to
Springfield Corridor

40,000,000

ME

Several projects

38,385,495

NJ

Portal Bridge
Milwaukee to Madison
Corridor
Empire Corridor +
Rochester Station
Pacific Northwest Corridor:
Union Station Roof
Union Station Access
Improvements
Missouri State Rail Plan +
additional projects

38,500,000

38,500,000

30,000,000

30,000,000

WI
NY
OR
DC
MO
MI

5,545,733

FY09

FY10
Planning

State

FY10 SDP

Grand Total

116,000,000

3,030,771,742
1,269,560,998

735,458,912
22,000,000

50,500,000

500,000

40,000,000
600,000

38,985,495

6,545,733

1,000,000

5,900,000

5,900,000
4,270,500

3,338,800

4,270,500
3,838,800

500,000

3,620,552

Chicago to Detroit

542,000,000

3,620,552

WV

Colorado State Rail Plan +
Denver Interregional Study
West Virginia HSIPR
Planning

GA

Various Studies

750,000

750,000

PA

Keystone Corridor:
Keystone West

750,000

750,000

Delaware Intercity Rail
Connection
Kansas Service
Development Plan (SDP)

450,000

450,000

250,000

250,000

New Mexico State Rail Plan

100,000

100,000

CO

DE
KS
NM

Grand Total

5,783,492,232

1,400,000

1,400,000

1,000,000

1,000,000

8,120,500

1,100,000

Note: FYO9 Fiscal Year 2009.
FY10 Fiscal Year 2010.
FY10 SPD Fiscal Year 2010 Service Development Program.
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The back-and-forth between the states and the federal government on ARRA funds
indicates the federal government has not arrived at a clear plan for growing the US HSR
industry. A recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) points out that
FRA had been mainly concerned with rail safety until it was suddenly given the task of
disbursing ARRA funds and drawing up a national HSR plan on short notice. The report
gives FRA credit for handling the situation but notes that it was understaffed. The FRA
HSR office had only 23 staff members. It had to hire additional staff and also pull staff from
other DOT projects to handle the workload.
New Mexico
Delaware
West Virginia
Missouri
Nebraska
Oregon
Texas
Wisconsin
Maine
Vermont
Connecticut
Massachusetts
Mid-West
NorthEast Corridor
Washington
California
-

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

Federal Funding (US$ Millions)

Figure 3. Breakdown of Federal HSR Funding by State HSR Projects in 2010
In fact, if additional funds are set aside for HSR, the agency is in the unenviable position
of having to staff up and manage several multibillion-dollar projects in several states and
a technology with which it has limited experience.
Despite these challenges, the GAO continues to support the initiative of developing
HSR in the US. In their review of how ARRA HSR funding was disbursed the GAO wrote
“In summary, we found that while the potential benefits of high-speed rail projects are
many, these projects—both here and abroad—are costly, take years to develop and
build, and require substantial up-front public investment, as well as potentially long-term
operating subsidies. Determining which, if any, high-speed rail projects may eventually
be economically viable will rest on factors such as ridership potential, costs, and public
benefits.”
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HIGH-SPEED RAIL POLICY
Over the period during which the HSR corridors were designated, the GAO continued to
emphasize the need for dedicated HSR funding,10 leadership, clearly defined goals and
structural framework11 if HSR is to be implemented as a feasible transportation alternative
in the United States. In a 2009 report to Congress the GAO noted the need to:
• Develop a written strategic vision for high-speed rail, particularly in relation to the
role high-speed rail systems can play in the national transportation system, clearly
identifying potential objectives and goals for high-speed rail systems and the roles
federal and other stakeholders should play in achieving each objective and goal.
• Develop specific policies and procedures for reviewing and evaluating grant
applications under the high-speed rail provisions of PRIIA*12 that clearly identify the
outcomes expected from the award of grant funds and include performance and
accountability measures.
• Develop guidance and methods for ensuring reliability of ridership and other
forecasts used to determine the viability of high-speed rail projects and support
the need for federal grant assistance. The methods could include such things
as independent, third-party reviews of applicable ridership and other forecasts,
identifying and implementing ways to structure incentives to improve the precision
of ridership and cost estimates received from grant applicants, or other methods
that can help improve the reliability of such forecasts.
The report also noted that “the infusion of up to $8 billion in Recovery Act funds is only
a first step in developing potentially viable high-speed passenger rail projects. Several
issues that have hampered development of these projects remain and will need to be
resolved to effectively spend Recovery Act funds. Surmounting these challenges will
require federal, state, and other stakeholder leadership to champion the development of
economically viable high-speed corridors and the political will to carry them out. It will
also require clear, specific policies and delineations of expected outcomes, and objective,
realistic analysis of ridership, costs and other factors to determine the viability of projects
and their transportation impact.”
Several policy issues including those highlighted below continue to handicap the
development of HSR at the federal level in the US:
• There is no clearly articulated US HSR policy framework at the federal level.
The “Preliminary National Rail Plan”13 developed as part of PRIIA broadly discusses
high-speed rail and its potential, and summarizes the results from outreach surveys
that were conducted with various stakeholders. It falls short on specifics and does
not set forth any real “plan”. Another federal document, the “Vision for High-speed
Rail in America”14 lays out the anticipated plans for developing HSR in the US. It
is, however, narrowly focused on how funds from recent legislation like PRIIA and
* Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA): Reauthorizes Amtrak and tasks
Amtrak, US DOT, FRA, states, and other stakeholders to improve intercity passenger rail and work
toward the development of high-speed rail corridors.
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ARRA will be used to start up HSR development in the US. It has no clear longterm policy or framework beyond PRIIA and ARRA. As the GAO has noted, for
the government to succeed in the development of both intercity passenger rail and
HSR it needs a plan that, at minimum, describes a) how intercity passenger rail fits
into the national transportation system, b) defines the vision and goals for HSR in
the country and within that context, c) clarifies the federal role in achieving these
goals.15 Also, most states do not have a documented rail plan, and this will hamper
the development of HSR, as there is no policy on how the existing rail systems will
interact with HSR.
• The lead agency (FRA) is not positioned to handle HSR development. Amtrak
was created to take over operation and development of intercity passenger rail in
the US from freight operators, while FRA has been responsible for regulating safety
of both passenger and freight rail operations as well as overseeing rail transport
policy within the national framework. Though FRA developed the first US HSR
project (NECIP), this was eventually transferred to Amtrak for completion. Since
FRA was later tasked with distributing ARRA funds, it seems likely that it will be
lead agency in charge of HSR development. Also PRIIA tasked FRA, not Amtrak,
to develop the National Rail Plan and assist states in developing state rail plans
because the state plans involve freight as well as passenger issues and because
Amtrak is an operating entity, not a policy agency. The federal government needs
to come out clearly on this issue and staff the FRA-HSR office accordingly. The
agency had to request support staff from other DOT agencies to handle the ARRA
fund applications and is ramping up its passenger rail staff from 23 to 46. Though
laudable, these staffing adjustments cannot transform it from a rail safely regulatory
agency to one managing multiple multibillion-dollar construction projects.
• There is no functional legislation guiding the development of HSR. Though
ISTEA provided for designation of HSR corridors and PRIIA mandates the
development of a National Rail Plan, both legislations are very broad and do not
provide much specificity. For example PRIIA required funding be provided to only
states that had state rail plans but there are no defined criteria for what should be in a
state rail plan. Neither PRIIA nor ARRA provides a comprehensive framework within
which HSR could operate. Until Congress buys fully into the current administration’s
push for HSR, it is unlikely the legislative gap will be bridged in the near future. This
will create challenges for HSR development in the US.
• There is no reliable source of funding for HSR. The former ARRA funding was a
boon to the HSR industry, but it was ad hoc and was passed by Congress as part
of an economic stimulus package, not because of a decision by the legislature to
support HSR development. Follow-up legislation such as Hon. James Oberstar’s*
$50 billion proposal for high-speed rail in 201016 did not make it through the
legislative maze, encountering strong opposition from Republicans responding to
pressure from the Tea Party movement to push for cutbacks in government size and
spending.17 The governors from Wisconsin and Ohio returned HSR-ARRA funds in
the midst of a recession. Both governors had campaigned against high-speed rail
* Honorable James Oberstar was Chairman of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
from 2007 to 2011.
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funding and wanted to divert the funds to other transportation (road and freight)
projects. The transportation secretary, however, refused and reallocated their funds
to other states, noting the ARRA law does not allow HSR funds to be used for
other transportation modes. The Tea Party has been very vocal in their opposition
for HSR, and both of these governors came into power with strong support from
the movement. North Carolina also recently passed a law barring the state from
accepting any additional federal HSR funds. Without a stable and reliable source of
funding, the HSR initiative will not succeed in the US. It is not farfetched to imagine
a scenario where a new administration could abandon the decision to build HSR
altogether.
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III. INTERNATIONAL HIGH-SPEED RAIL DEVELOPMENT
This section provides a survey of HSR developments in Asia and Europe. It looks at the
motivation for adoption of HSR, development costs, level of patronage of the system,
revenue generated and profitability of selected projects. The aim is to provide a context to
discuss the potential pathways HSR implementation could take in the United States.

JAPAN: A WORLD LEADER
No discussion of HSR is complete without a mention of Japan, the first to develop a
commercial high-speed rail train and a leading nation in HSR railway technology worldwide.
Built in 1964, Japan’s Tokyo-to-Osaka high-speed rail line was the first, and is still the
busiest, high-speed rail line in the world. The line is usually referred to as the Tokaido
Shinkansen. Tokaido is the name of the Tokyo-Osaka corridor and Shinkansen means
“new trunk line” (referring to its status as the world’s first).

Motivation and Development of HSR System
In 1939, the Japanese government began acquiring land for a proposed “bullet train” that
was to run from Tokyo to Osaka, and on to Shimonoseki at the western tip of the Honshu
Island, at speeds of up to 124 mph (200 km per hour). However the project was shelved
due to the World War II. It was revived again after the war when the main Tokyo-Osaka
corridor was experiencing increasingly heavy congestion, with 186 passenger trains and
124 freight trains traveling the corridor each day. The highways were also heavily congested
and the fastest way to travel between Tokyo from Osaka was a one-hour flight by air.
The densely populated corridor is a highly active economic region that accounts for 50
percent of Japanese GDP; hence, efficient movement of goods and passengers along
the corridor is a national priority. The key motivation of the project was the need to ease
congestion and improve capacity on both the rail and highway corridors.
Japan National Railways then-president Shinji Sogo and vice president of engineering
Hideo Shima are credited with being influential in convincing the government to pursue the
Shinkansen option. Three development options were under consideration at the beginning
of the project: a parallel, narrow-gauge line next to existing rail lines; a narrow-gauge line
on a new route; or a standard-gauge* line on a new route. The Shinkansen project was
eventually built to the standard gauge specification. This meant other Japanese trains
could not share its tracks. Additional distinguishing features in are the use of lightweight
electric multiple unit (EMU) train sets† and separate stations for the Shinkansen. The actual
operating speed of the Shinkansen of 130 miles per hour over the 500-km route put the
Tokaido Shinkansen on a firm footing to compete with automobile and rail in terms of travel
time along the length of the corridor.
* Gauge is the distance between rails: the narrow gauge then was 1,067 mm (based on British standard
gauge), while the worldwide standard gauge was 1,435 mm.

† EMU stands for Electric Multiple Units, which are trains where each carriage had its own electric motor
unit, in contrast to trains where the carriages were drawn by a locomotive unit at the end.
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The $3.2 billion project was financed partially by a $80 million World Bank loan.18 Kasai19
and Wakuda20 both report that Shinji Sogo made a strategic decision to obtain a World
Bank loan in order to ensure the Japanese government did not back out of the project
midstream. Sogo eventually had to resign over controversies that he was funneling funds
from other railway projects to the Shinkansen project when the project’s initial $1.6 billion
estimate ballooned to $3.2 billion. Kasai and Wakuda both state the initial low estimate
was intentional, as Sogo knew the government would not have approved the project at
full cost. The project was finally completed in October 1964 and opened just in time for
the Tokyo Olympics. Published documentation of this kind has been used by opponents
of high-speed rail in the US. Given that most of the loan packages for Japan’s later HSR
lines had to be restructured and some of the debt written off, the issue of the reliability
of projections for HSR demand and construction costs is not trivial. Since several of the
proposed US HSR lines could be built within the same decade, the government could find
that by the time it has enough data to credibly estimate costs and evaluate projections;
most of the HSR funding will have been disbursed and spent.

Achievements
The Tokaido Shinkansen initially reduced the six-hour-and-forty-minute conventional rail
trip time to four hours. Future vehicle upgrades to the Tokaido Shinkansen reduced the
travel time to less than three hours. The latest published schedules,21 indicate the new
N700 train sets makes the Tokyo-Osaka trip in 2 hours 33 minutes at a speed of 270 km
per hour. The train has a very high level of reliability with reported average delay of 0.6
minutes per train (over the entire year), even counting uncontrolled circumstances, such
as natural disasters.22 The project has been hailed as a success because of its high level
of ridership and revenue generation.
Competition with Air Travel
The various Shinkansen lines are very competitive with air travel at distances of 200
miles or more (three hours by auto) as illustrated by three typical trips below:
• Tokyo-Osaka (320 miles): both the Shinkansen system and the airlines make this
journey in two-and-a-half hours (including boarding time), but the Shinkansen system
offers 238 departure times per day (approximately once every 10 minutes*) while
airlines offer only 110. The Shinkansen has more than 80 percent market share.
• Tokyo-Okayama and Tokyo-Hiroshima lines: Air and rail travel times are again the
same, as is the greater frequency of Shinkansen departures. However, due to flexible
air ticket fares and occasional promotions, the market share is approximately equal
for both.
• Tokyo-Fukuoka (665 miles): The Shinkansen takes about five hours with the fastest
model, while the flight takes only two hours. The frequency of the Shinkansen is
less than the airlines as well. Most of these passengers prefer to fly because of the
substantial difference in travel time.
* Nozomi use the N700 Series trains that are capable of speeds of 300 miles per hour and is the fastest
service on the Sanyo and Tokaido Shinkasen lines.
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Travelers prefer the Shinkansen because of the high departure frequency, high on-time
schedule reliability, low fares, convenience and safety. There are also a high number of
local transit lines connecting to the system, making it easy to conveniently access the
system. For trips greater than four hours, airlines become more attractive because the
time saved provides greater value than the cost savings of rail.

System Expansion
Spurred on the by the high level of patronage of the Tokaido Shinkansen, the Japanese
government passed the Nationwide Shinkansen Railway Development Act23 to develop
a nationwide Shinkansen railway system connecting the major urban areas. The act
served as the basis for extending the Shinkansen lines to cover the whole nation. The
law establishing the act states “the goal is to boost the national economy, expand the
livelihood domain of the citizenry, and promote regional development.” Shinkansen
railways are defined as railway lines that could attain speed of 200 km per hour, or more,
in predominant sections along the line.
The first expansion was the Sanyo Shinkansen, which extended the Osaka end
southwestward 389 miles to Hakata. Next, the Tokyo end was expanded 335 miles
northward to Morioka as the Tohuku Shinkansen. The next extension was the 200-mile
Joetsu line from Tokyo to Niigata. Plans for other Shinkansen lines include the Kyushu
(westward from Hakata to Kagoshima-Chou), the Akita (Morioka to Shin-Aomori), the
Nagano (Tokyo-Omiya-Nagano), and the Yamagata, and Hokkaido Shinkansen.
The development act gave the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Tourism
responsibility for development of the HSR lines. Once the Basic Plan was outlined by the
Infrastructure Ministry, the Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency
(JRTT), in conjunction with the ministry, selected the contractor and operator. The act also
allowed for JRTT to be appointed as a contractor. Construction costs were to be shared
between the National government and the municipalities through which the lines passed,
and municipalities were responsible for land acquisition related to the project.

Current State
The Shinkansen system now comprises a network of high-speed railway lines operated
by six companies under the Japan Railways Group. In addition to reducing travel time, the
system has improved energy efficiency. HSR is four times as efficient as automobile travel
and five times as efficient as airline travel. According to Okada,24 the per capita emission
of CO2 by the Shinkansen is one-fifth that of automobiles and one-sixth that of airlines.

Cost
The gains in speed and convenience came at a high price. Construction costs were very
high due to the high cost of land acquisition and the rugged topography of Japan25, which
required extensive tunneling, and bridge building. More than 140 miles of the project
involved expensive infrastructural features that accounted for 45 percent of the project
costs.
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The Tokaido line has 80 tunnels (totaling more than 38 miles), and the Tanna Tunnel, the
longest, is close to five miles in length. The line has eleven miles of bridges, a mile-and-ahalf-long subway and expensive, elevated tracks. The Sanyo and Sanyo Shinkansen also
have a similar profile, with Taniguchi26 putting the final infrastructure and land costs at 58
and 25.8 percent of the project, respectively.
The total cost and cost-per-mile for newer Shinkansen lines have increased with each
line. When the Tokaido line was built, the construction cost was $2.66 million per mile, the
Joetsu line ended up costing $32 million per mile.

Table 4.

Cost per Mile of Shinkansen Systems27
Million (US$)

Section Length

Cost/Mile

920
2950
11,020
6690

346
389
335
209

2.66
7.58
32.90
32.01

Tokaido
Sanyo
Tohoku
Joestu

Revenue and Profitability
Demand for the Tokaido Shinkansen is high, as it is built along a heavily travelled and
congested rail and air corridor. Annual ridership for the Tokaido line in 2009 was 149 million
passengers, or approximately 409 thousand passengers daily. Though the project overran
its budget, the high level of ridership on the dense corridor generated enough revenue
within ten years to pay for both construction and operating costs.28 Though the Tokaido
Shinkansen was profitable, the mismanagement of the Japanese National Railways (JNR),
which was in charge of the country’s railway system, cast a shadow over its success.
JNR began to experience deficits in 1966, shortly after the Tokaido Shinkansen was
completed. The operating losses continued to rise due to a combination of factors: the
government rejected multiple requests by JNR to increase rail fares overall; politicians
pushed for the construction of local railway lines in their districts despite the fact that existing
lines were losing money; and the government approved legislation to provide subsidies to
JNR but never issued the funding and instead pushed the agency to borrow money from
the private sector via bonds. These and several other factors, including overstaffing, a
heavily subsidized fare system,29 and a push to build new Shinkansen lines, eventually led
to JNR accumulating an unsustainable level of debt.
Multiple reorganization and restructuring plans were initiated starting in 1996
but the Japanese government sidestepped the issue of raising fares until 1976.
By then it was “too little too late.” Even though fares doubled on some commuter routes
between 1978 and 1982 JNR’s losses continued to accelerate until, in 1988. Taxpayers
had to shoulder $233 billion of the company’s debt as part of a restructuring plan. The
original JNR was broken up and privatized. The Shinkansen systems were split into several
Japanese railway companies, each responsible for a given section of the Shinkansen
system.
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The Tokaido line has continued to be profitable and even has supported $41 billion of the
debt of the Sanyo, Tohoku and Joetsu Shinkansen lines. The island Japanese Railway (JR)
lines (JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, JR Kyushu) continue to be subsidized by the government,
so the low-density unprofitable lines with low travel volumes can continue operations.
Kasai’s book the Japanese National Railways – Its Breakup and Privatization chronicles
the factors that led to the demise of the JNR in relation to the development of Japan’s
Shinkansen System. Matsuda30 also published an excellent discussion on the system in
“Making the Impossible Possible: One Man’s Mission to Reform the Japanese Railways.”

TAIWAN AND KOREA: PRIVATIZATION VERSUS PUBLIC FUNDING
We compare the Taiwan and Korea high-speed rail projects because they were built at
nearly the same time and the respective governments took different funding approaches.
Taiwan pursued a “build-operate-transfer” model, which was a first for HSR projects,
while Korea used the standard public funding approach. Korea wanted to gain expertise
in the technology, while Taiwan wanted the system built with minimum involvement from
the government. The comparison will be of interest to states in the US as they consider
different funding mechanisms.
The Taiwan HSR (THSR) was built to ease increasing congestion on the highway network
due to intercity travel between Taipei and Kaohsiung. Construction on the HSR line began
in March 2000, and the project was completed and put into service in January 2007.
The THSR is based on Japan’s Model 700 Shinkansen system and has a top speed of 186
mph along the 214-mile line. Its mechanical and electrical systems are built to European
standards. It was co-developed by Central Japan Railway Company and West Japan
Railway Company as a modification of the Shinkansen 700-E series trains. The completed
HSR train reduced the travel time between Taipei and Kaohsiung from 4.5 hours to just 90
minutes.
The THSR system currently has eight stations – Taipei, Banciao, Taoyuan, Hsinchu,
Taichung, Chiayi, Tainan, and Zuoying – with five more planned for the future (in Nangang,
Miaoli, Changhua, Yunlin and Kaohsiung). THSR reached the 5-million-passenger
milestone five months after it was launched and by September 2007 had sold more than
ten million tickets.31 The system carried more than 15 million passengers in its first year of
operation, an average of 65,000 per day. Train schedules have been ramped up from 19
per direction per day to 60. The system currently provides 91 services per day, about the
half capacity of the line.
Thirteen billion dollars was to be invested in the Taiwan HSR project using a build-operatetransfer (BOT) strategy. The reported total construction cost, however, was $18 billion.
The high-speed rail system generated revenues of $18.3 and $20.39 million in its first two
months of operation, far below the monthly expenditure of over $304 million.32 After nine
months of operation the reported sales was a total of US $279.6 million. Table 5 gives a
breakdown of monthly revenue from January 2007 through May 2009. It shows revenue
almost doubled from 2007 to 2008 and was gradually increasing in 2009.
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Table 5.

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Total

Monthly Revenue from Taiwan’s High-Speed Rail System
2007
NT$ (millions)

2008
NT$ (millions)

599.3
669.3
867.7
1,030.3
1,078.2
1,136.0
1,282.2
1,260.0
1,268.3
1,320.4
1,414.0
1,578.3
13,503.8

1,551.0
1,728.6
1,903.9
2,100.0
1,903.5
1,875.9
2,038.4
2,168.6
1,816.1
2,109.9
2,028.7
1,991.6
23,216.0

2009
NT$ (millions)
2,230.9
1,735.1
1,908.8
1,856.1
2,040.4

Korea also recently completed construction of new high-speed rail lines. The 256-mile
Korean HSR connects the capital, Seoul, to Busan in the south. The project was developed
in two Phases: Phase 1 from Seoul to Daegu, began in 1992 and was completed in 2004,
while Phase II from Daegu to Busan was completed in November 2010. Upgrades were
also made to the conventional rail line from Daejeon to Mokp’o in the southwestern portion
of the country.

Private versus Public Investment
The two countries, Korea and Taiwan, chose very different approaches to building their
projects because they had different objectives. Korea went with a publicly funded project
administered through the Korean High-Speed Rail Construction Authority, while Taiwan
took the private track, using a build-operate-transfer funding mechanism to fund the project.
Both countries were building to relieve congestion on their road networks, but Korea had
an additional objective of acquiring the technical knowledge and capability to build highspeed rail lines. For Taiwan, the absence of the latter objective made it easier to privatize
their project in the form of a 35-year build-operate-transfer contract. Privatization was to
bring several benefits, including:
• Minimizing the extent of political interference in the project (the public agency, which
can be easily influenced by politicians, operated more in an administrative role, with
limited decision-making power politicians had limited influence once terms of the
contract were finalized and executed)
• Having the contractor source project funds from the private sector freed up public
sector funds that would otherwise have been tied up on the project
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• Using private sector funds additionally reduced the level of risk facing public sector
funding (HSR for Taiwan is high risk in the sense that they had no prior technological
knowledge and would be learning on the project)
• Sourcing of private sector capital puts pressure on the BOT contractor to make
judicious use of the funds in order to both minimize interest payments, and maximize
any returns over the life of the project
• The contractor had a high incentive to complete the project in a timely manner, as
the 35-year contract concession period included the construction phase
In choosing this approach, Taiwan sacrificed the ability to acquire HSR technology
capability. This is understandable; given the size and shape of the country, it is unlikely
many HSR lines will be built in the future. Korea, on the other hand, has the potential to
expand and upgrade several of their existing rail lines around the country.
In retrospect, the Taiwanese did not achieve most of their goals. Kien-hong and Johannesson
document how the ridership projections for the project never materialized. Within two years
(in 2009) the government had to take over the project.33 The government also allowed the
system to be built to European standards and then forced the use of Japanese rolling
stock. The resulting incompatibility caused major cost increases and schedule delays.
Initial ridership projections of 140,000 passengers per day never materialized. In the first
year the ridership numbers were abysmal at 50,000 passengers – a little more than onethird of the original projection. By 2010, almost four years after service started, ridership
was at 101,000 passengers per day.34

CHINA: USING HIGH-SPEED RAIL TO DRIVE DEVELOPMENT
China has achieved remarkable progress in building up its high-speed rail system. The
China high speed rail program was launched in 2003, and the first line – the D460, from
Shanghai to Suzhou – went into service in 2007.

Motivation and Development of HSR System
The key initial motivation behind China’s HSR program was boosting economic
development by connecting key major cities, and freeing up capacity on overcrowded
freight corridors. In line with this objective, technology transfer has been a core component
of the nation’s high-speed rail development program. China insisted from the onset that
all foreign companies that won contracts to build HSR lines form joint ventures with local
companies and commit to technology transfer. The proposed massive market of more than
8,000 miles of HSR lines in one country gave China a very strong negotiating position, as
there was no single concentrated purchase of HSR technology.
China’s HSR program rollout has been accelerated recently, and by the end of 2008, the
nation had more than 3,986 miles of HSR lines with speeds above 124 miles per hour. The
current plan is to expand the system to 8,077 miles lines by 2012, with 4,900 of those miles
traveled by trains that operate at speeds above 217 mph.
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China has 2,191 km of high-speed rail tracks, with design speeds of 350 km per hour. In
2010, China’s HSR led the world in network size. The country also has the world’s longest
line: 1,069 km, running from Wuhan to Guangzhou.35 The Beijing-Tianjin line is China’s
most heavily used line. It began commercial service on August 1, 2008, seven days before
the Olympics. It shortened the 75-mile trip from 2 hours to half an hour and was the first
train model completely developed in China. The model, called “Dongchezu,” set a new
speed record of 217 miles per hour for a commercially running train.

Acquiring Technology
Most of the major international high-speed rail train makers, including Alstom (France),
Bombardier (Germany), and Kawasaki (Japan), transferred technology to China that the
Chinese integrated to eventually build their local CRH (China High-speed Rail) train sets.
Several models have been developed from the technology gained. Most of the parts for
CHR trains are manufactured locally. The fastest CRH train set as of the time of this writing
was the CRH380 series, which can achieve design speeds of up to 380 km per hour.
China has been so successful in adapting the technology; it has begun competing for
projects on the international scene. The China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC)
has won contracts to build HSR lines in several countries. Both Siemens and Alstom have
teamed up with CRCC to build HSR in Saudi Arabia, and China recently put in a bid to
construct and finance California’s high-speed rail project.
China’s Maglev train between Shanghai International Airport and Pudong was the first
commercial service line in the world. The train completes the 18-mile journey in less than
8 minutes at speeds of 268 miles per hour. Ridership, however, has been very low – about
20 percent of capacity – as the train only terminates at an airport and most travelers are
not willing to pay the $7 one-way fare. A map of the China High-Speed Railway network is
shown in Figure 4.

Profitability
The construction cost of HSR lines in China have varied widely from approximately 8 to
55 million US dollars per mile in 2011. This wide variation is very typical of HSR lines,
as construction costs are affected by the number of tunnels and bridges, terrain, land
acquisition costs, and passage through densely populated areas and downtown districts.
The variation is not unexpected given the size of the network. Compared to Japan, China’s
land acquisition costs are at the low end, and the government does not need to buy land
as most of the land in China is publicly owned and managed by provincial governments.
The China high-speed rail program has faced some challenges recovering cost. Though
limited publicly published reports could not be accessed for this study, it appears the HSR
is mainly attracting premium air and business travelers rather than travelers from auto
and rail modes. Two lines from Beijing to Jinan in Shandong province and from Tianjin to
Jinan had to be suspended in July 2011,36 as ridership levels were at 20 percent capacity.
It appears several of the Chinese HSR lines have not been profitable.
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Figure 4. Main Lines in China’s High-Speed Rail Network
Source: TransportPolitic (modified by author).

Setbacks
Despite early successes China’s high-speed rail has suffered some setbacks. In July 2011,
39 people died when a high-speed train ran into the back of another, which had stalled, on
a viaduct near Wenzhou after lightning cut its power supply. Six carriages derailed and four
fell from the viaduct 20 to 30 meters (65 to 100 ft.), killing 32 people and injuring nearly 200
people.37 In addition, the Railway’s minister was forced to resign in February 2011 over
corruption allegations related to the development of China’s high-speed rail system.
The Chinese have slowed their trains, partly because of the accident, but also to save
energy: the extra demand is not worth the extra energy. The government will need to act
quickly and responsibly to improve safety and public confidence in the system if it wants to
sustain and increase demand on HSR lines in the country.
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EUROPE: BUILDING UP AN INTERCONNECTED HIGH-SPEED RAIL
NETWORK
This section gives an overview of the HSR projects in major countries in Europe. The
countries with the most developed HSR networks in Europe are France, Germany, Italy
and Spain.

France
France kicked off the HSR race in Europe when it launched the Paris-to-Lyon TGV
(Train à Grand Vitesse) HSR train line in 1983. The project was motivated by the need to
increase capacity on congested sections of their existing network. It involved developing
a completely new alignment that shortened the existing track length from 520 to 120 km
(323 to 74 miles). New, lighter train sets that needed less expensive infrastructure were
developed for the system.

Achievements
As in Japan this first (for France) HSR project was very successful in many respects total
traffic on the corridor almost doubled from 12.5 to 22.9 million passengers between 1980
and 1992, 18.9 million of whom rode the TGV-HSR (Vickerman 1997).38 The TGV both
generated new trips and diverted trips from other modes. It reduced travel times between
Paris and Lyon to two hours from four hours. Air travel between Paris and Lyon fell by 50
percent from 1980 to 1984, while car traffic on the A6, a parallel motorway, grew at about
one-third the rate of other nearby motorways.

Expansion
The project was financed by the national railway SNCF and was fully amortized by 1993.
Due to the resounding success of the Paris-Lyon project the government teamed up with
SNCF to develop and extend the network in France.
The network was extended westward and southwest as the TGV-Atlantique in 1989. The
southern portion of TGV-Atlantique connects Paris to Bordeaux through Tours, reducing
the Paris-Bordeaux journey from four hours to three. Two years after the line opened, rail
travel between and Paris and Bordeaux had increased by 17 percent while air travel had
dropped by 50 percent. The westward link connected Paris to Nantes. The government
funded 30 percent of the construction cost for TGV-Atlantique.
Next to be built was TGV-Nord in 1993, which connected Paris to Lille in the north. The link
was developed in anticipation of the Paris-Lille-London line through the Channel Tunnel.
Traffic grew by 25 percent in the first three years. Other extensions to the TGV network
include the TGV Rhône-Alpes (1992/1994), which extended the Lyon line southward,
creating connections to Spain at Beziers and into Italy at Nice.
It is worth noting that, as in Japan, the expanded lines have not been as profitable as the
initial line. Vickerman induced demand by examining the impacts of the three-pronged
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French network on business traffic. He found the effects varied significantly and are very
context-specific. For example, in the case TGV- Paris-Lyon, the traffic growth was in both
directions. Along the TGV-Atlantique there were mixed results. Tours, which is an hour
from Paris by TGV, witnessed a 24 percent reduction in business traffic while Nantes,
two hours from Paris, saw business traffic grow 66 percent. However the growth was
unbalanced, with a 99 percent increase in traffic originating from Paris but only 55 percent
increase in the traffic originating from Nantes. From Paris to Toulouse (5 hours), even
though business traffic grew 21 percent, the increase was mainly due to the market share
grabbed from airlines. Thirty-five percent of the growth was from Toulouse, while traffic
originating from Paris actually fell by 5 percent.
The key takeaway is that, aside from the much-trumpeted potential of HSR to grab market
share from airlines, depending on how much economic activity occurs between specific
origin-destination pair, some regions tend to benefit more than others. According to
Vickerman39,40 regional studies in Europe seem to indicate HSR leads to a concentration of
economic activity at the already-developed economic centers. In a review, Chapulut, JeanNoel and Jean-Pierre Taroux note that several TGV projects have overestimated demand
and underestimated costs and few have achieved their target rates of return.41

Figure 5. France National High-Speed Rail Network

Germany
Germany tested an EMU train with speed of 124 miles per hour in 1903 but did not put
their Inter-City-Express (ICE) trains in service until 1990. High-speed rail was introduced in
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Germany to increase capacity for both passenger and freight trains and free up bottlenecks
on north-south routes. In developing their HSR system, Germany opted to build the tracks
to serve both freight and passenger trains. According to Giovani, “This feature turned out
to be a disadvantage since it led to high construction costs (to support the higher load of
freight trains) and low utilization of the lines (since freight trains operate at much lower
speeds).”42
Due to the presence of several medium-sized cities spread out around the country,
HSR development in Germany is more diffuse compared to France, with an emphasis
on upgrading speeds on existing lines rather than building new dedicated HSR lines.
In general, the German network has lower speeds compared to the system in France.
Passenger load factors* in the German system are averaging 50 percent compared to 70
percent in the French network.43

Spain
The Spanish AVE (Alta Velocidad Espanola, or “Spanish high-speed”), network is similar
to that in France in that it is centered on Madrid. According to Boras, et al (2011), the 1979
General Railway Master Plan for Spain had proposed the construction of three new lines to
resolve capacity constraints in the existing network.44 One of the constrained corridors was
the Getafe-Córdoba section between Madrid and Seville. It was built to the international
gauge of (1,435 mm) instead of the Iberian one (1,668 mm). The line was then extended
to Seville as the country’s first HSR line. The key HSR route in Spain, from the south, is
Seville-Madrid-Barcelona which then connects to the network in France (see Figure 5).
Service is available westward from Madrid to Valencia and then north to Barcelona. There
are plans to develop the network to cover the western portion of the country and also
connect to Portugal.
A unique feature of Spain’s network is the fact that the existing rail is built to the Iberian
gauge (i.e., the distance between the two parallel rails) of 1,672 m (5 ft. 55/6 in.), which is
different from the international standard gauge of 1,435 mm (4 ft. 81/2 in.). The HSR trains
in Spain are thus designed to run on both gauges. Newly constructed HSR lines in Spain
use the international gauge; however a section of the Madrid-to-Barcelona track (from
Zaragoza to Huesca) is constructed to be used by both standard-gauge high-speed trains
and Iberian-gauge Spanish trains. The additional engineering to implement such links
increases the cost of the HSR system.45

Developing a System-Wide Network in Europe
As shown in Figure 6, the HSR network in Europe has its core in the cities of Brussels and
Lille. The three-pronged network in France has been a central link in the bid to build up a
European high-speed rail network. Lille is connected to London to the west and Paris in
the south, while Brussels is connected to Amsterdam in the north and Cologne to the east.

* Load Factor – percent of available seat capacity utilized. If on a given trip a train with 200 has seats 120
seats filled then load factor is 102/200=0.6.
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Though France, Italy, Spain and Germany have the most extensive high-speed rail
networks, they are not the only countries pursing HSR development in Europe. Several
countries, namely Sweden, Norway, Poland, Finland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, are
all at various stages of either building HSR lines or upgrading their existing lines to speeds
between 100-155 miles per hour.
These upgraded lines are sometimes referred to as accelerated–rail to distinguish them
from high-speed rail. Despite the name, these projects still require substantial investments
and significantly improve the door-to-door travel times of travelers, ultimately attracting
travelers from other modes to rail, which is the core motivation for developing HSR.
In 1996 the European Union (EU) decided to get involved in HSR development and issued
its first directive46 on HSR. The directive noted that there are major differences between
the regulations of each nation and the internal rules of the national railways in the Union.
The internal rules incorporate techniques that are specific to the national industries. These
internal rules tend to prescribe specific dimensions and devices and special characteristics
that create situations that made it difficult for high-speed trains to run normally throughout
community territory.47
The EU also noted that this setup creates “very close links between the national railway
industries and the national railways, to the detriment of the genuine opening-up of
contracts.”
• The directive defined essential technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) to
ensure interoperability in the fields of infrastructure, energy, control-and-command
and signaling, and rolling-stock for the trans-European high-speed train system.
• The directive also defined HSR as “specially built high-speed lines equipped for
speeds generally equal to or greater than 250 km/h, or specially upgraded highspeed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h, or - specially upgraded
high-speed lines which have special features as a result of topographical, relief or
town-planning constraints, on which the speed must be adapted to each case.”
• The directive created a body with a director and staffs to check and ensure national
rail organizations and operators were abiding by the directive. The directive was
further updated in 2002.48 Among other things, the update extended the rules to
apply to renewals or maintenance-related replacement. In addition the directive
states that, upon request, “Member State informs the other Member States and
the Commission of the relevant national technical rules in use for achieving
interoperability and meeting the essential requirements of Directive 96/48/EC.”
The EU’s initial efforts to develop a Trans-European Rail Network (TEN) have been focused
on formulation of policies to ensure interoperability of equipment. However, the current
system is very inefficient for travelers making trips across multiple countries because
ticketing is handled by multiple entities that have overlapping jurisdiction. For example,
Thalys operates lines between Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam, this overlaps with
SNCF (France) and Eurostar (joint UK, French and Belgian) services between Lille and

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

28

International High-Speed Rail Development

Brussels, and ICE (German) services between Brussels and Cologne.49 This is because
the European HSR networks were developed and operated by individual countries before
the EU began developing TEN. The development of the TEN remains a work in progress
and much needs to be done to make the system truly trans-European, especially from the
perspective of travelers.

Figure 6. High-Speed Rail Network in Europe in 2010
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IV. TOWARD A MORE COHERENT US HIGH-SPEED RAIL
POLICY FRAMEWORK
The review of international HSR experiences shows that countries that have implemented
HSR have very focused reasons for pursuing HSR systems. Korea and Taiwan used HSR
to relieve congestion on both their conventional rail and road networks. Europe has used
HSR to relieve congestion on their conventional rail lines by providing additional capacity
with improved quality of service and, in some cases, to spur economic development.
France built separate, new HSR lines that took the passenger trains off the freight lines to
improve passenger travel times and also free up capacity for freight trains. Germany also
built their HSR systems to improve passenger travel times. Freeing up capacity for freight
was not as crucial in the case of Germany as the HSR trains are built to share tracks with
the conventional and freight trains. China is using HSR to spur economic development,
and free up capacity in their rail network for freight trains. These justifications, however, do
not work as well for HSR in the US.

MAKING THE CASE FOR HIGH-SPEED RAIL IN THE US
The issues that will drive development of HSR in the US are different from those in Europe
and Asia. Intercity travelers benefit from the well developed interstate highway system and
mainly experience congestion close to their origin and destination cities. Areas like the
Northeast Corridor, where several urban areas lie close together along an extensive stretch,
are the exception. Due to the large area encompassed by the US, and long distances
between major population centers (compared to Europe), most roadway congestion in
the US is experienced by commuters making short trips (less than 100 miles) during the
morning and evening peak periods50 rather than long distance trips in the 100- to 500mile range where HSR has the highest payoff. Hence, the case for implementing HSR to
reduce current congestion levels on the road network is weak.
In fact, extensive investment in the interstate highway and airport system in the US has
made it harder to build a competitive case for additional investment in HSR.
The ownership structure of the rail network in the US is the opposite of most of the
countries reviewed. In the US, freight companies own most of the rail network and Amtrak,
the passenger train operator, has to negotiate with them for use of their lines. Hence,
there is no pressing need to free up capacity for freight companies. Amtrak owns the
Northeast Corridor tracks from Washington, DC to New York and from New Haven to the
Massachusetts.
Unlike airports and roads that are built in all states, HSR systems perform best along
corridors passing through clusters of high-density-population centers with significant
economic activity. An examination of Figure 2 shows that several US states do not have
designated HSR corridors because they do not have these high-density, economically
active population centers. This has implications when HSR policy and funding is debated
at the federal level. Representatives from states that will not have HSR lines may adopt
stances ranging from lukewarm to opposing HSR projects. Some level of negotiation will
be needed to iron out the HSR funding level and source.
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We believe one of the reasons why the US continues to lack a firm HSR policy framework
is that advocates have not developed a few key, compelling arguments that politicians can
coalesce behind to push for HSR development. HSR advocates in the US tend to tout the
environmental benefits, job creation potential, safety and high travel time reliability of HSR.
The job creation benefit, though appealing in the current recessionary environment, may
not sound very attractive to policymakers (legislators) once the recession turns around
and the economy is on the mend. ARRA is a typical example. It was easy to set aside $8
billion for HSR in the bill based on its job creation potential; however, James Oberstar’s
follow-up proposal for $50 billion did not materialize. Job creation is a benefit that will be
realized as HSR projects are built, but it is not a good justification for investing in HSR
because, inter alia, the same jobs would be created from any transportation infrastructure
of other investment programs.
The environmental impact benefits, though acceptable, are much harder for the average
everyday traveler to perceive. Most travelers make their daily choice of transportation
modes based on economic/cost constraints rather than environmental considerations;
hence, there is limited pressure on legislators from constituents to invest in HSR for
its environmental benefits. It is also worth mentioning that other researchers question
the environmental benefits of HSR, arguing that the benefits change based on whether
emissions from the construction are included, and also on the no-build case used in each
context.51
The on-time reliability, improved speeds (shorter travel times), and safety of HSR may be
the strongest selling point for HSR in the US. The challenge is that these benefits are best
seen when one rides or experiences an HSR system. Most travelers in the US currently
have no conventional rail service available, and there is no HSR train for them to ride
either. This makes it hard to rally enthusiasm among the current populace to push for HSR
investment.
Though congestion levels on intercity highways are not at unbearable levels, most legislators
are aware they need to develop additional capacity to support the growth in demand that
will come with population growth in the future. HSR will definitely be a strong contender
in meeting some of the future capacity needs. The challenge in solving future congestion
problems is lower on the totem pole for many local public agencies that have their hands
full grappling with rush-hour gridlock within and on the periphery of their jurisdictions.
Dealing with HSR intercity, travel-related issues that span multiple regions and, in some
cases, states is not high on the list of most transportation agencies and legislators and,
is no simple matter in the context of the US Constitution which requires Congressional
approval for interstate compacts.*
Until HSR advocates can agree on a coherent and focused rationale, or congestion
becomes a problem on intercity routes, it appears that most HSR initiatives in the US will
face an uphill battle.
* Interstate compacts are agreements between two or more states of the United States of America. They
are regulated by Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution which states that no state shall
“enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power” without the consent of
Congress.
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LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE
In the most recent MTI report on HSR, “leadership coupled with means and authority”
was identified as a critical ingredient for success of HSR projects.52 For example, though
political leaders in Pennsylvania were enthusiastic about HSR early on, they made almost
no headway until 1999 when Amtrak and the State entered into a joint Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU). The MOU provided $140 million for infrastructure and equipment
upgrades on the Philadelphia Harrisburg line to reduce trip times to 90 minutes (shortest
current rail trips is 1 hour 40 minutes and drive time is 1 hour 56 minutes). This is an
arrangement whereby leadership, authority to execute the project, and the financial means
came together.
HSR projects also face opposition from specific communities that may be impacted or
even perceive a negative impact from an HSR project. This is played out very clearly in the
case of California where there is stiff opposition from communities along the HSR project
line, such as Palo Alto and Orange County. The most formidable obstacle at the state level
has been political support.
Florida’s HSR has never lacked for champions (leaders) for its HSR initiatives. These have
included Governor Bob Graham (1979-1987) and recent avid advocates, such as Doc
Dockery, who spent his personal funds to draft and promote a constitutional amendment
directing the legislature to develop a high-speed rail system. Due to difficulty getting buyin from Florida governors and legislators, the state has lacked the means and authority.
Recently, even after federal funds were allocated to fully pay for the Tampa-Orlando
project, it was shut down when the governor returned the funds to the federal government.
Clearly, all three ingredients – leadership, means and authority – are key to the success of
HSR initiatives, but leadership with authority appears to be the most critical ingredient for
HSR initiatives to survive. Even with careful planning, a well-laid-out legislative framework
and adequate funding from the federal government, the governor was able to scuttle the
Tampa-to-Orlando project simply by rejecting the federal funds.
Florida Example: Chen53 believes a series of political and strategic factors came together for Florida being given such a large sum. He notes that the I-4 corridor population played a key role in Obama’s 2008 victory, and also Florida’s electoral representatives actively lobbied the transportation secretary. However, he also acknowledges
Florida’s State legislature worked hard to put together a cost sharing package that
made it clear to the federal government they wanted the project. Additional strategic
factors that played a role in the decision were:
• The federal government needs a showcase project that it can use to trumpet its
policy decision to invest in HSR, in that sense the Tampa to Orlando corridor is one
of the shortest that could be completed quickly
• Florida’s flat topography will aid a fast construction of the project as it does not have
to deal with tunneling and steep slopes (all factors that Campos and de Rus54 and
several others have pointed out increase construction costs)
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• Building the project along the along the Interstate 4 median significantly reduced the
cost of land acquisition as the Federal government already owns that right of way
• Building on the median also reduces amount of environmental impact as the existing
freeway already has created the major impacts
• Florida’s State legislature worked hard to put together a package in which they
voted to contribute $300 million to the project as cost sharing

There may be some merit to Chen’s theory of political factors weighing in if one considers some of the comments of a recent GAO report. The report states that FRA followed
all the standard procedure for allocating such a contract, but noted that there was no
clear documentation why some of the projects were chosen above others.

SUSTAINED FUNDING FOR HIGH-SPEED RAIL
The cost of developing a high-speed rail system is so high that very few states have the
means to fund the initial construction, even for potentially profitable lines; hence, federal
funding is needed. At the federal level, most funding bills have floundered and failed.
A key factor has been that the federal government is overextended simply maintaining
the current transportation system and other sectors of the economy, as are most state
governments. As mentioned earlier, HSR systems perform best in areas with closelyspaced, high-density population centers. This means that several states, particularly those
in the Midwest, will not have HSR lines. Hence, any federal funding scheme should be
structured so that it is acceptable to states that will not benefit directly.
The funding should be a mixture of grants, loans and bonds, but should be heavily skewed
towards bonds. The bonds should be state-sponsored but guaranteed by the federal
government. (The appropriate mix of grants, loans and bonds in the funding scheme is
beyond the scope of this project.) This will ensure that those states that benefit directly
bear most of the financial burden, reducing the likelihood of resistance from states without
HSR projects. The federal government must establish criteria as to which HSR lines they
will support and finance. As revealed from the review of international HSR in Europe and
Asia, only the first couple of HSR lines developed by most nations were profitable. The
subsequent lines that were built to expand the systems were not financially sustainable in
most cases. The federal government should pay close attention this finding and require
projects that receive federal support to show that ticketing revenue will cover operating
costs plus a percentage of capital costs.
For projects spanning multiple states, member states may have to negotiate what level of
financial responsibility they will bear, and this will require detailed negotiations and financial
setups that are not addressed in this report. States that do not benefit directly from HSR
will still contribute to the HSR systems through taxpayer-funded loans and grants, and
this is equitable, since some of these citizens will, at one point or another, use the HSR
systems. Moreover, as with urban mass transit, citizens of one state may well benefit from
improved economic efficiency in any other state through increased business interchange.
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Also given that intercity travelers are not currently experiencing severe congestion, the
greatest beneficiaries of the HSR systems are those who will use them ten to twenty-five
years down the line. So having a setup where those beneficiaries pay off the bonds (cost
of the system) in the future is more equitable than having current taxpayers fully fund the
system.
The federal funding going forward should be initiated and set at the by Congress rather
than the Executive branch. The funds should come from a dedicated, long-term source,
such as an extended fuel tax. This is needed so to instill confidence in private investors
and other stakeholders, such as train set manufacturers, that the resources they allocate to
HSR development are a wise investment. Without a dedicated funding source and support
from the government, these third parties will consider HSR too risky and their incentive to
allocate capital to such projects will be minimal.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
William Vickrey proposed road congestion pricing* in the US by 1952, but no project was
ever implemented in the states. In the 1960s the UK developed a congestion-pricing scheme
for downtown London but did not implement it. Rather, it was Singapore that implemented
the first project in 1975. It took 28 years, until 2003, for London to finally implement their
downtown congestion-pricing project. Only recently has the US begun to put into place a
hodge-podge of freeway pricing projects using congestion pricing principles.
When looking at HSR development worldwide, one is uncannily reminded of how often
history repeats itself. In a sense, the US was a leader in the HSR race with the efforts
to build faster interurban trains. In the early 1900s the St. Louis Car Company built a
100 mile-per-hour train, “the private car Alabama,” for Henry Huntington’s train network in
Southern California.55
However, once again, it was Japan an Asian country that built the first commercial HSR
train for the 1964 Olympics before other nations began to take HSR seriously. It took 11
years after the Shinkansen was introduced for the first commercial service train to become
operational in Europe. Though America passed the High Speed Ground Transportation
Act in 1965, it still does not have a fully functional HSR system. Though they are capable
of attaining speeds of 150 miles per hour, the Acela train sets currently run at an average
of approximately 84 miles per hour. This is due to electrification and issues related to the
alignment of the track on the Northeast Corridor.
HSR, like most capital infrastructure projects, is expensive: current estimates of construction
costs are in the range of $35 million to $70 million per kilometer.56 Most projects take
several years to build, and if the projected ridership does not materialize, the project will
suffer substantial financial losses. If projects are funded by the government, a substantial
amount of taxpayers’ money is at risk. Given the above, it is not surprising that HSR has
both supporters and detractors.
Supporters point to its reliability, convenience, speed, social and environmental benefits,
revitalization of the rail industry, and job-creation potential. Detractors question the high
sunk costs, with the accompanying high risk of public funds, and the fixed nature of rail.
They also assert that HSR serves only a limited demographic of the population on a given
route. As the HSR network in Europe has been developed, several studies have explored
both sides of these debates, trying to understand the impacts of HSR and also to learn
whether the benefits outweigh the costs.
Clearly the federal government is moving to address the financial gap. However, several
other challenges persist. Even with private advocates like Doc Dockery in Florida and the
full heft of the federal government, the Florida project was still shut down. The federal
government has been forced to make a correction mid-course has delayed any hopes of
having HSR in the Florida for some time to come.
* Road Congestion Pricing involves charging road users a fee during peak periods in order to reduce the
number of vehicles that will opt to use a facility during that time. This helps reduce the level of congestion
without building more roads to accommodate the congestion during peak periods.
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Conclusions

HSR has been advocated in the US based on to its ability to reduce travel time and the
potential to create jobs and generate economic activity. The latter two justifications were
high on the agenda when ARRA was passed. Since then, the Obama administration has
been struggling to motivate Congress to commit to substantial funds to HSR. The downside
of the jobs creation pitch is that, as the economic environment improves, it becomes a
harder sell. Also, HSR has no greater potential to create jobs than any other project of
similar size. To overcome resistance, policymakers need to come up with rational, long
term justification for investment in HSR.
Currently, the federal government lacks a coherent policy on HSR. There is no clearcut legislation like the Passenger Rail Service Act (which created Amtrak) that commits
the government to developing HSR. There is no clarity about which agency will be in
charge of developing HSR. FRA would be the logical entity, but it has been focused on rail
safety rather than development. As mentioned earlier, it had to scramble to put together
staffing to disburse ARRA HSR funds. Amtrak is interested in taking a leadership role, as
evidenced by its recent decision to create a dedicated department within the agency that
focuses exclusively on HSR,57 but it does not have a legal mandate to administer federal
funds for HSR projects. It is likely FRA will be the lead agency in managing HSR in the US.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The US should consider creating a large scale, federally funded program to give it leverage
in negotiations with foreign agencies that possess HSR technology. The nature of HSR is
such that it is likely to be successful on selected corridors that have high population density
and significant economic activity. The currently identified HSR corridors are adequate.
The eleven corridors designated have very high levels of intercity travel demand and, if
current trends continue, are likely to experience high levels of congestion in their highway
networks due to increased population growth and high economic activity. The airports in
most of these regions are already experiencing high levels of traffic.
Even though the designated corridors have high traffic, the current levels of congestion are
manageable. However, since HSR involves multibillion-dollar projects that will span more
than ten years from planning through construction, HSR projects need to begin now if they
are to meet future needs. A large part of most HSR investment costs go into construction
that needs to be funded long before the system begins to function and generate revenue.
Private capital for such investments is limited due to the high uncertainty of completion,
high risk of unprofitability and long waiting period before any revenue is generated. federal
funding is needed because the states where these corridors are located do not have
resources to raise such huge sums.

FEDERAL ROLE
To effectively invest such a massive amount of capital in multiple HSR projects the federal
government needs a more structured policy framework than is currently in place. At
minimum, the federal government needs to do the following:
1. Develop a policy framework.
Designate the key agency that will be focused on planning, development and
management of multiple HSR systems in the United States. The mandate of the
agency should be clearly spelled out in a legislative instrument like the Passenger
Rail Service Act that created Amtrak.
The Federal Railroad Administration is a good candidate but will need additional
staff in order to maintain its current legislative rail safety mandate and function.
The agency staff will, at minimum, need expertise in project management due to
the size of the project, strong financial management due to the massive amount
of capital involved, and past experience building HSR projects due to the differences between HSR and mainline rail.
The agency should be under (or at least affiliated with) the Department of
Transportation so it can tap in the institutional project development and management capacity the DOT and Federal Railroad Administration have developed over
the years.
2. Establish dedicated funding.
A dedicated funding source should be created for the construction of HSR proj-
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Recommendations
ects, otherwise very few states and almost no private-sector investors will be
willing to initiate projects.
3. Provide guiding legislation.
Federal government needs to move quickly to develop regulations and specifications for HSR design and construction, as the different performance characteristics make them incompatible with the current specifications for rail in the US.
When the California High-Speed Rail Authority wanted to consider tilt technology,
for example, they had to independently work with FRA to discuss its feasibility,
because the existing guidelines written for conventional trains do not cover this
technology. Allowing this situation to continue will create a legal minefield and
high insurance costs when these HSR systems need to be insured after construction.
Federal rules on legal challenges and insurance costs will help reduce the level
of risk for HSR development and encourage private sector participation in the development process. Without the federal government’s involvement most private
entities will be slow to participate in public-private partnerships due to the high
risks to capital and possible escalation of insurance costs due to lawsuits.
Almost all rail tracks in the US are owned by freight rail companies. States with
HSR projects that want to build along those tracks or, in rare cases, use them,
will have to negotiate with the freight rail companies directly. A law extending or
defining the terms under which such negotiations should take place will be helpful to states entering into this process. The law creating Amtrak defined a framework of the track-sharing relationship between Amtrak and the freight companies.
Federal legislation is needed to define the infrastructure sharing agreements between freight companies and HSR entities.
4. Support a demonstration project.
Given the absence of HSR in the United States and the partisan nature in which
the debate over HSR has evolved, the federal government should consider supporting a corridor as a demonstration project. This demonstration project should
be along a highly trafficked route, be relatively inexpensive and have a short
construction timeline.
The Tampa-Orlando project in Florida that was shut down when the governor
rejected and then returned ARRA funds would have been an ideal demonstration project. The HSR line was a good candidate as a demonstration project. The
construction cost of $2.4 billion was covered by the allocated ARRA grant, and
the location – in a highly visited tourist destination – promised the opportunity for
a lot of US citizens to see and probably a ride on an HSR system. It was slated
to be built along the median of Interstate-4 and therefore had few right-of-way
acquisition hurdles.
In fact if one closely looks at the way the HSR funds were disbursed, the initial $2.4 billion allocated to Florida may have been an astute strategic decision.
By allocating such a large proportion of funds to one of the most feasible projects, a showpiece HSR project would have been completed in a highly visited
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tourist location, thereby exposing several million US citizens to the technology.
With the Florida project cancelled and a large amount of the funding allocated to
California’s system, which will take a long time to complete, it appears the window
of opportunity to build such a demonstration project is almost closed.

STATE ROLE
The high costs and long lead times needed to develop HSR projects mean that states
wanting to begin new projects need careful planning and guidance. The lessons enumerated
from the Florida experience and the California project (see Appendix A) are anecdotal but
very instructive.
California started with a legislative mandate that specified the role of the California HighSpeed Rail Authority, while Florida depended on a political champion and then followed up
with the legislative mandate. Both have had rollercoaster rides trying to maintain support
for their projects through changing administrations. Florida has had their project shut
down and restarted at various turns, while, for California, the greater difficulty has been
getting policymakers to fund CHSRA consistently. Both a political champion and a legally
mandated entity are important, but given the experience of both states, it is critical the
legislative body be established early on.
Acquiring right-of-way in the US is a more tenuous task than in Europe and Asia, as most
of the land and tracks in the US are privately owned. The CHSRA is having a firsthand
experience as it has had to negotiate with various freight providers and deal with several
environmental issues with regard to land traversed by the project. States should seriously
consider building their HSR lines within the median of existing freeways wherever the
alignment will permit in order to minimize environmental impacts and also because the
right-of-way within most of these medians already belongs to the state.
Most states have limited financial resources and, unlike the federal government, cannot
run large deficits to fund project. Hence, states that want to significantly fund their projects
need to put in place a plan to bring in private capital as early as possible.
States that decide to embark on HSR should make sure there is formal legislation is in place.
Given the massive amount of investment involved, most HSR projects will need some form
of political support. States must have a well-thought-out plan, and a dedicated individual
(or body) that will work with the various legislative and political arms of government to build
and sustain support for their projects through the development and construction phases.

FUTURE OF THE INDUSTRY
In addition to the policy measures recommended, a huge issue facing the nascent industry
is the lack of HSR expertise in the US. This lack of expertise is noted in a recent GAO
report in which potential train set manufacturers say it would take a minimum of two years
to ramp up capacity to test and build train sets in the US.
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The Mineta Transportation Institute, in collaboration with the California High-Speed Rail
Authority, California State University, and several private and public agencies, has begun
work on the issue. The federal government needs to quickly begin to focus on developing
educational and training centers to build up capacity to develop the HSR workforce in the
US.
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APPENDIX A: WHITE PAPER ON CALIFORNIA HIGH-SPEED
RAIL PROJECT
California voter’s approval of a $9.95 billion State bond for California’s high-speed rail
(HSR) project in 2008 and the Obama Administration’s decision to set aside $8 billion in the
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) for HSR projects have propelled
HSR into the forefront of discussions on how to meet the nation’s future transportation
needs.
Prior to the designation of the ARRA funds most state HSR initiatives had slowly ground to
a halt. Other than the Northeast corridor Acela Express from Washington, DC to Boston,
it began to look like California was the only state on track to build a high speed train
system. This paper takes a look back at California’s experience in keeping its project alive
despite several challenges, and the hurdles the HSR authority had to surmount to keep
the project alive. The lessons learned are instructive for other States pursuing high-speed
rail initiatives.

INTRODUCTION
Even though the debate about whether high-speed rail (HSR) is right for the US will
continue, the stance of the current administration is clear. From public statements by the
president, his vice president (an avid train enthusiast), and the secretary of transportation,
it is apparent the executive branch has made a decision to integrate HSR into the mix of
transportation options for the US going forward.
This paper takes a look at the development of HSR projects in the United States, with a
focus on California’s experience to date. Prior to the designation of ARRA funds, most
state HSR initiatives had slowly ground to a halt. Other than the Northeast Corridor Acela
Express from Washington, DC to Boston, it began to look as if California was the only state
on-track to build a high-speed train system. This paper takes a look back at California’s
experience in keeping its project alive despite several challenges, the current status of the
project, and plans of the California High-Speed Rail Authority going forward. The lessons
learned will serve as guide for other states pursuing high-speed rail initiatives.

US HIGH-SPEED RAIL PROJECTS
Before the passage of the ARRA the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in several
reports noted the federal government’s limited leadership role in promoting HSR projects
in the United States in contrast to Europe and Asia. The United States continues to lag
behind other nations in developing HSR networks. Europe has more than 5,000 miles
of HSR lines, while Asia, with more than 6,000 miles already, plans to build more in the
coming years.
GAO has consistently documented the need for the federal government to define a clear
role of how high-speed rail fits into plans to meet the nation’s transportation needs. In their
2009 report to congress, the GAO noted that although the $8 billion in ARRA funding was a
step in the right direction, it is a relatively small down payment considering California alone
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is expecting $18 to $21 billion in federal support to build the Los Angeles-to-San Francisco
line. In testimony supporting the report, the GAO representative noted that “High-speed
rail projects are costly, risky, take years to develop and build, and require substantial upfront public investment as well as potentially long-term operating subsidies.”58
Other challenges facing states are the reliability of ridership forecasts, determining and
quantifying public benefits, sustaining public support over long construction periods, and
obtaining stakeholder consensus. These are all issues that have plagued California’s
project at various stages. The GAO says there is a need for a dedicated funding source,
leadership, clearly defined goals and a structural framework if HSR is to be implemented
as a feasible transportation alternative in the United States.
In fairness, the federal government has made several attempts to investigate the feasibility
of high-speed rail projects. As far back as 1965, Congress passed the High Speed Ground
Transportation Act59 authorizing $90 million to develop and demonstrate HSR technologies.
Five years later, in 1970, President Nixon passed the Passenger Rail Service Act,60 which
created Amtrak to take over the intercity passenger rail service that freight rail companies
found unprofitable.
According to the Federal Railroad Administration, it had spent up to $3.3 billion on
improvements to the North East Corridor by 1997.61 Amtrak, in collaboration with the
Federal Railroad Administration, has been responsible for developing the Acela Express,
the only functioning HSR project in the United States to date, on the Northeast Corridor. The
Acela Express train sets are capable of attaining speeds of 150 miles per hour; however,
they operate at top speeds of only 150 miles per hour between New York and Boston and
135 miles per hour between New York and Washington. Currently, the average operating
speed between Washington, DC and Boston is approximately 83 miles per hour due to
electrification- and track-related issues on the corridor.
Legislators have included high-speed rail in the Railway Safety Improvement Act (RISA),62
and in 2010 the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure set aside $50
billion for high-speed rail in the Authorization Bill, but this did not pass.
The FRA designated 11 HSR corridors in the continental US. These corridors were selected
as a result of stipulations included in the Surface Transportation Efficiency Acts. According
to the FRA website, the first five HSR corridors were designated under the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA).63 A list of the corridors designated
under the ISTEA is provided in.
The Northeast Corridor, from Washington, DC to Boston, MA, was, until recently, technically
not a federally designated corridor, as it is funded under a different legislative instrument,
the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project.* In March 2011, US Transportation Secretary
* FRA financed the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP) between FY 1976 and FY 1998 for a
total cost of $3,937.3 million, including $12 million for the Penn Station Redevelopment project in FY
1998. Amtrak has invested in the corridor itself, though that figure is not readily available. Nevertheless,
certain of Amtrak’s appropriations have been directed specifically to Northeast Corridor expenses,
including $7.9 million in FY 1976 and $293.1 million in FY 2003 (FRA Website).
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Ray LaHood designated it an HSR corridor. The Secretary also extended the scope of the
California corridor to Las Vegas, Nevada, in July 2009.
The FRA allocated the bulk of ARRA funds to six major corridors as shown in Table 7.
However, several developments have changed the actual amount of funds disbursed and
the recipients.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix A: White Paper on California High-Speed Rail Project

44

Second Batch - Six Additional Corridors

First Batch - Five Initial High-Speed Rail Corridors

Table 6.

White Paper: Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors

Chicago
Hub
Network

Initially designated on October 15, 1992 as the Midwest corridor, it consisted of
three spokes emanating from Chicago, IL, westward to Milwaukee, WI, east to
Detroit, MI, and south to St. Louis, MO. In December 1998, the Milwaukee link
was extended to Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN and a new spoke to Indianapolis, IN
and Cincinnati, OH was added. The Indianapolis/Cincinnati link has been extended
through Ohio in a closed loop running from Cincinnati to Columbus, Cleveland,
and Toledo and back to Chicago. The Indianapolis link has also been extended to
Louisville, KY.

Florida
Corridor

Initially designated on October 16, 1992, runs from Miami in the south to Orlando
and westward to Tampa.

California
Corridor

Also designated October 19, 1992. Runs mainly north-south along the state, linking
the major metropolitan areas of San Diego, Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area
and Sacramento via the San Joaquin Valley. On July 2, 2009, US Transportation
Secretary Ray LaHood announced extension of the California high-speed rail
corridor to Las Vegas, Nevada.

Southeast
Corridor

Designated in October 2000 as a link between Charlotte NC, Richmond, VA, and
Washington, DC. In December 1995, it was extended all the way to Macon, GA,
passing through Greenville, SC, and Atlanta, GA. The Richmond link was also extended to Hampton Roads, VA. In December 1998, the Macon, GA, loop – passing
through Jacksonville, FL, Savannah, GA, and Columbia, SC back to Raleigh, SC
– was closed. The Southeast corridor in its final form in 1998 is better characterized
as a network. The corridor now covers six states: Florida, Georgia, South and North
Carolina, Virginia and Washington, DC.

Pacific
Northwest
Corridor

Designated in October 1992. Links Eugene, OR, to Vancouver, BC, Canada, passing through Portland, OR, and Seattle, WA, on the way north. The corridor is 466
miles long.

Gulf Coast
Corridor

Designated November 18, 1998. Another of the multi-state corridors, it traverses
six states: Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and New Orleans.
There are three legs originating from New Orleans, LA. The westward leg goes to
Houston, TX, the eastbound leg to Mobile, AL, with an intermediate stop in Biloxi,
MS, and a third leg runs northeast to Atlanta, with major stations in Meridian, MS,
and Birmingham, AL.

Keystone
Corridor

Designated in December 1998. A planned, multi-state corridor with the west/east
link from Pittsburg, PA through Harrisburg to Philadelphia. The north/south link starts
in Washington, DC, and runs through Baltimore, MD, Wilmington, DE, Philadelphia,
PA, Trenton and Newark, NJ, and ends in New York.

Empire
State
Corridor
Northern
New
England
Corridor
South
Central
Corridor

Set up to connect Boston to various states in the Northwest. Boston, MA, is the
center, with connections to Portland/Auburn, VT, and Montreal, PQ Canada, Albany,
CT and New Haven, CT.

North-East
Corridor

In March 2012, the Transportation Secretary officially designated the existing
Northeast Corridor, from Washington, DC, to Boston, MA, a high-speed rail corridor.

Designated in December 1998. Planned to run from west to east end of New York
State, Buffalo to New York City, with stops in Rochester, Syracuse, Utica and Albany.

Designated in 2000, it is another of the multi-state corridors. The Texas link is from
San Antonio, TX, in the south, to Dallas-Ft. Worth in the north. Dallas Ft.-Worth is
then linked to Tulsa, OK and Little Rock, AK.
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White Paper: Initial Funding for US High-Speed Rail Corridors
Planned

Table 7.

Charlotte - Raleigh
- Richmond Washington, D.C.

North Carolina,
Virginia,
Washington,
D.C.

Chicago - St. Louis Kansas City
Minneapolis/St.
Paul - Madison Milwaukee - Chicago

Illinois, Missouri,
Kansas
Minnesota,
Wisconsin,
Illinois

Illinois DOT,
Missouri DOT
Wisconsin DOT,
Minnesota DOT

Pontiac - Detroit Chicago

Michigan,
Indiana, Illinois

Michigan DOT,
Indiana DOT,
Illinois DOT

Cleveland Columbus - Dayton
- Cincinnati

Multiple Stations

Ohio

Multiple States

Multiple States

California

San Diego - Los
Angeles - San
Francisco Bay Area Sacramento

Tampa - Orlando

Eugene - Portland Seattle - Vancouver,
B.C.

Oregon,
Washington,
Vancouver, B.C.

Florida

Main Stations

Benefiting
States

Ohio DOT

Multiple States

Multiple States

Florida DOT

North Carolina
DOT, Virginia
DOT

ARRA Awardees
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Three state governors – of Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin – returned their ARRA funding as
a politically motivated protest of government spending. Due to their actions, the secretary
of transportation reallocated the funds to other projects. To date, only $5.8 billion dollars
of ARRA funds have been obligated. Table 8 lists both ARRA and other federal rail-related
funds (that can be used for high-speed-rail-related projects) that have been allocated to
states at the beginning of July 2011. The data was compiled from information on the FRA
website.

CALIFORNIA HIGH-SPEED RAIL CASE STUDY
Comparing Table 7 and Table 8, California is now set to receive over $3 billion in federal
funding; not counting the remaining $5 billion in ARRA funds left to be disbursed. This puts
them in line to be one of the first fully dedicated HSR projects likely to be completed in the
United States.
New Mexico
Delaware
West Virginia
Missouri
Nebraska
Oregon
Texas
Wisconsin
Maine
Vermont
Connecticut
Massachusetts
Mid-West
NorthEast Corridor
Washington
California
-

500
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1,500
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3,500

4,000

Federal Funding (US$ Millions)

Figure 7.

White Paper: Breakdown of Federal HSR Funding by State HSR Projects
in 2010

The California High-Speed Rail Authority (CAHSRA) is responsible for construction of
California’s high-speed rail project. CHSRA came to life under the California High-Speed
Rail Act (SB 1420)64 sponsored by Senators Kopp and Costa in 1996. Prior to that, the
state’s high-speed rail ambitions had been nurtured by the Intercity High-Speed Rail
Commission created in 1993. SB 1420 gave CHSRA the legislative mandate to implement
intercity high-speed rail in the state. The Authority was to be composed of nine members,
with five appointees by the governor, two by the Senate Committee on Rules and two by
the Speaker of the Assembly. A lively documentation of the development of the California
high-speed rail project is chronicled at the University of California, Davis website.65
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White Paper: Disbursement of ARRA and High-Speed Rail Funds in
2009/10
Description

ARRA

CA

California High-Speed Rail +
Other State Projects

2,908,371,742

6,400,000

IL

Chicago to St. Louis: 2010
Early Construction Projects,
Englewood Flyover

1,268,310,998

1,250,000

WA

Pacific Northwest Corridor:
Service Block 2-SEA-PDX 6
RTs- ARRA Redistributed

735,458,912

NC

Piedmont/Charlotte/Raleigh

520,000,000

MD

BWI Airport Station
Improvements

69,400,000

69,400,000

FL

Tampa to Orlando:
Program Management and
Preliminary Engineering

66,660,000

66,660,000

VT

Vermonter New England
Central Railroad Route
Improvements

50,000,000

CT

New Haven to Hartford to
Springfield Corridor

40,000,000

ME

Several projects

38,385,495

NJ

Portal Bridge
Milwaukee to Madison
Corridor
Empire Corridor +
Rochester Station
Pacific Northwest Corridor:
Union Station Roof
Union Station Access
Improvements
Missouri State Rail Plan +
additional projects

38,500,000

38,500,000

30,000,000

30,000,000

WI
NY
OR
DC
MO
MI

5,545,733

FY09

FY10
Planning

State

FY10 SDP

Grand Total

116,000,000

3,030,771,742
1,269,560,998

735,458,912
22,000,000

50,500,000

500,000

40,000,000
600,000

38,985,495

6,545,733

1,000,000

5,900,000

5,900,000
4,270,500

3,338,800

4,270,500
3,838,800

500,000

3,620,552

Chicago to Detroit

542,000,000

3,620,552

WV

Colorado State Rail Plan +
Denver Interregional Study
West Virginia HSIPR
Planning

GA

Various Studies

750,000

750,000

PA

Keystone Corridor:
Keystone West

750,000

750,000

Delaware Intercity Rail
Connection
Kansas Service
Development Plan (SDP)

450,000

450,000

250,000

250,000

New Mexico State Rail Plan

100,000

100,000

CO

DE
KS
NM

Grand Total

5,783,492,232

1,400,000

1,400,000

1,000,000

1,000,000

8,120,500

1,100,000

Note: FYO9 Fiscal Year 2009.
FY10 Fiscal Year 2010.
FY10 SPD Fiscal Year 2010 Service Development Program.
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SB 1420 allowed for CHSRA to be terminated at the end of December 2000 if a financial
plan for the implementation of HSR had not been approved by state voters. As stipulated
by the legislation, CHSRA presented its business plan in June 2000.66 The plan placed
the cost of constructing a high-speed rail line linking San Diego to the San Francisco Bay
Area and Sacramento at a cost of $25 billion (1999 dollars). Some of the issues the plan
addressed are:
• Train systems: it deferred selection of train technology to the environmental impact
report and environmental impact statements (EIR/EIS) but it did recommend a system
capable of attaining speeds of 200 miles per hour, driven by electric propulsion, and
grade separated, with state of the art signaling technology.
• Route/alignment: it recommended a preliminary highest return on investment but
deferred actual selection of the final route to the EIR/EIS study. The route was from
San Diego, through Ontario Airport, Los Angeles and then San Francisco via the
Peninsula, with a separate leg from Merced to Sacramento.
• Ridership: ridership was forecast at 32 million passengers annually, of which 12.2
million would be business travelers. The majority of the trips – 11.2 million – were
projected to be from the Los Angeles region to the San Francisco Bay Area. The
analysis assumed 45 percent of the ridership would be diverted from air transportation
and 42 percent from private automobiles.
• Revenue: was projected at $888 million based on the expected ridership, with $465
million of this coming from business travelers.
• Benefits: a benefit/cost analysis put the ratio at 2.06. This was based on benefits of
$44.4 billion and costs of $21.5 billion.
The plan recommended that the governor and legislature take steps to initiate a formal
Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), make
funding available to improve access rail to the potential high-speed rail network, and step
up advocacy at the federal level for funding for high speed trains in California. It also asked
legislators to encourage state, regional and local entities to include high-speed trains in
their planning.
In response to the 2000 business plan recommendations, the California legislature passed
bills to fund both the high-speed rail project and the environmental impact studies for the
project. The Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act (Senate Bill 185667)
was promulgated in 2002 to raise funds for construction of the HSR by issuing $9.95 billion
in general bonds in California. The act required that $9 billion be used in conjunction with
federal funds for planning and construction of the high-speed train system. The $950 million
was to be used to improve rail access to the high-speed train system, as recommended
by the business plan. The legislature also provided $20 million in 2004 for CHSRA and the
FRA to conduct a programmatic level EIR/EIS study.
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Though Governor Gray Davis signed SB 1856 into law in 2002 for voters to ratify in the
November 2, 2004, general election, the vote did not take place until 2008 in the form of
Assembly Bill 3034. SB 1856 was first delayed by Senate Bill 1169 that postponed the vote
to November 7, 2006, because of California’s fiscal situation. Then in June 2006, the vote
was again moved – to the November 4, 2008, general election – and modified to Assembly
Bill 713. Finally, in 2008, AB 3034 modified some of the provisions in the original SB 1856
legislation, and voters passed it in the November 4, 2008 election.
Among others, AB 3034 stipulated:
• The high-speed train system was to be built to specifications of the EIR/EIS reports
(certified November 2005 and July 2008) rather than the business plan.
• Excess revenues generated from operation of the high-speed train system (beyond
operating and maintenance costs and financing obligations) were to be used for
construction, expansion, improvement, replacement and rehabilitation of the system.
If excess revenues exceeded the amount needed to maintain the system they, were
to be deposited in the General Fund.
• The amount of the $9 billion bond that could be used for planning and environmental
studies was limited to 10 percent ($900 million), and the amount that could be spent
on administrative expenses to 2.5 percent.
• Priority was to be given to corridors expected to require the least amount of bond
funds as a percentage of total cost of construction when selecting corridors for
construction.
• The high-speed rail project was to be built as quickly as possible in order to maximize
ridership and mobility of Californians.
• The ballot measure was renamed to Proposition 1A as it is widely referred to in the
media.
Proposition 1A was put to the ballot on November 4, 2008, and passed with a majority
vote of 52.6 percent (6.5 million of 12.4 million votes). A revised business plan in 2008
increased the cost of the Los Angeles-to-San Francisco line to $33 billion (2008 dollars).
The 2009 Report to the legislature updated the cost to $35.7 billion 2009 dollars, with a
Year-of-Expenditure cost of $42.6 billion. In the current 2012 Updated Draft business plan,
the cost of Phase 1 alone of the project is in the range of $68 billion.
The aim of California’s HSR project is to link the major San Francisco Bay Area cities
to the Central Valley and Southern California (Los Angeles/San Diego). The three major
population centers in the Bay Area are San Francisco, San Jose and Oakland. Until the
completion of the EIR/EIS in 2007, two major alignments – the ‘Pacheco Pass’ and the
‘Altamont Pass’ – had been hotly advocated for by different parties to connect the Bay
Area to the Central Valley.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

50

Appendix A: White Paper on California High-Speed Rail Project

After extensive analysis of the two major alternatives (6 alignments on the Pacheco Pass
and 11 alignments on the Altamont Pass), the 2007 EIR/EIS recommended the Pacheco
Pass to San Francisco (via San Jose) for the proposed HSR system. The CHSRA board
accepted the recommendation and the EIR/EIS (completed in 2007 and certified in 2008)
selected this alternative and put an end to the debate, at least for CHSRA. At this point, it
seemed as if the California high-speed rail project was about to take off smoothly. However,
in recent times the project has been challenged on several fronts.

Challenges
Community Opposition: Cities along the Peninsula, from San Francisco to San Jose
perceive the train tracks will split their communities and negatively impact their property
values. CHSRA staff says they are conducting additional outreach to better explain need
and impacts of the project to affected communities. The City of Orange on July 28, 2010,
voted on a resolution to oppose the project based on worries CHSRA might use ‘eminent
domain’ legislation to acquire land for the project. CHSRA in response issued a public
statement voicing disappointment in the city’s unwillingness to work with them on the
project. The statement said CHSRA will continue to reach out to residents of Orange
County.
Legal Challenges: Other groups have taken CHSRA to court over the EIR/EIS. Based on
the court ruling, CHSRA rescinded the Merced-to-San Francisco section of the EIR in order
to re-evaluate the corridor between San Jose and Gilroy where Union Pacific stated that it
did not want to allow the HSR line to use their right-of-way. Also, general review of noise
and vibration data is being undertaken for specific locations based on the court ruling. On
a positive note the judge didn’t allow a restraining order on the project (the Merced to San
Francisco Program Environmental Review was recertified identifying the same preferred
corridor on September 3, 2010). Though there are still threats of legal action, the attorney
general’s office has promised to defend the project.
Ridership Estimates: The University of California completed a review of the California
HSR project ridership forecasts for the California Senate Transportation and Housing
Committee.68 The University had strong objections about how CHSRA’s consultant,
Cambridge Systematics, developed the ridership estimates. Some of the issues the
University of California team had, included the fact that the survey to calibrate the model
had a disproportionately high number of air travelers (78 percent), neglecting the nearly
90 percent of long-distance (over 100-mile) business passenger trips that are made by car
in California. They also questioned the way the “stated preference” survey results were
analyzed when developing forecasts. UC felt the process used did not take into account
the fact that travelers using different modes have different perceptions of values of travel
time, cost, service frequency, and service reliability. They disagreed with the CS approach
of adjusting modeling constants to replicate observed market shares for the existing travel
modes in the year 2000 to correct the issue.
They questioned the CS changes of key parameters, such as headways after the model
development phase, using a priori expectations, and they also did not like the fact that the
model did not have station choices for high-speed rail stations. They felt this exaggerated
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the importance of the Pacheco. It was their contention that if their recommended corrections
were implemented, the ridership difference between the Pacheco and Altamont alignments
would be minimal.
Cambridge Systematics provided a spirited response to each of the comments, pointing
out that, in practice, adjustments need to be made to some of the theoretical constructs
in order to arrive at credible results. In conclusion, the review team felt the issues they
identified could significantly affect the ridership estimates, and reduce the projected
profits, leading to the possibility of significant revenue shortfalls. The CHSRA strongly
disagreed and pointed out that the report had not provided any analysis or estimates
to prove this. Given that this was a review, the review team would usually not conduct
additional analyses, so the question about the validity of estimates remains unanswered.
Project Funding and Administration: The state auditor also released a report in April
2010 raising concerns about the ability of the Authority to raise funds for the project,
especially the level of federal and private funding. CHSRA maintains the project plan has
always anticipated some level of federal funding and is working with the state auditor to
address some of the issues raised. The auditor report was followed a year later by the
State Legislative Analyst Office69 report that raised concerns about the level of autonomy
granted the CHSRA and its ability to manage such a large multibillion-dollar project. The
report recommended dissolving the existing CHSRA board and bringing the project under
Caltrans so it could benefit from Caltrans’ expertise in managing large transportation
infrastructure projects. The same report was quick to admit that Caltrans has no expertise
in HSR and Caltrans also may not have had experience managing such a large project
multibillion dollar project.
The above are a few of the challenges CHSRA has faced while trying to get the actual
project construction started.
Large infrastructure projects like HSR will negatively impact some communities and the
environment. Opposition to such projects from those impacted is not uncommon. CHSRA
admits to initially doing a lackluster job with outreach. They had multiple outreach firms
that sometimes delivered conflicting messages. The program has now been brought under
a single consultant, and, according to the Authority, this has brought more consistency and
uniformity to their message.

SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES
Until recently CHSRA has mainly been a planning, policy and advocacy team for HSR that
has relied heavily on consultants to do most of any technical work. The small structure
provided great flexibility in coordinating activities and decision making. The fact that
appointments to the CHSRA board are made collectively by the governor, state Senate
and state Assembly enables each of the appointees to reach and communicate with the
political and legislative arms of government. The small size of CHSRA allowed the body to
keep working when budget was low in certain years. More importantly, the small size of the
organization meant critical decisions could be made quickly on short notice with minimum
bureaucracy.
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Based on discussion with CHSRA board members and staff, some of the key factors that
have helped them push the project so far include:
• A strategic decision was made early on to put in place formal legislation at the state
level. This gave the HRS credibility and stability.
• The decision to operate as a separate entity was intentional, as there was
apprehension an agency like Caltrans, which is predominantly focused on highways,
would not devote as much attention to a mode like HSR that did not even exist in the
US. There are still discussions about bringing the Authority under Caltrans.
• Having board members appointed by various arms of government has provided
great leverage when there has been the need for advocacy.
• The board kept studies moving along even in years when funding was low. This
put them in a very strong position when opportunities like the ARRA funding came
along.
• Over the years, a strong stakeholder-support community has been developed. The
board engages with groups like the California HSR Coalition and the Sierra Club so
they can tap into support from their constituents if needed.
CHSRA is working feverishly to meet Notice of Determination and Record of Decision
deadlines (by September 2011) stipulated conditions to receive the $2.34 billion from the
ARRA stimulus package. A contract for construction has to be in place by September 2012
as part of the requirements to obligate federal funds.

CONCLUSION
CHSRA hired a new chief executive officer in June 2010 and has begun hiring and
expanding its staff in preparation for project construction. When the initial ARRA funds
were allocated, it appeared that Florida was in the lead to complete the first HSR project
in the US, but with the rejection of their funds, California may be the first to complete a
project in the US.
The HSR scene in the US continues to be in flux. The current administration still supports
the program, but those in opposition have also made gains, as evidenced by the decision
of three states to return their funding. The recent accidents on China’s HSR lines will also
taint HSR’s reputation as one of the safest modes of travel.
The review has shown building HSR will be very challenging. Even with funding in place,
relationships with politicians, stakeholders and affected communities need to be managed
carefully, otherwise projects could be suddenly delayed or derailed.
Other states embarking on the HSR development path can take a few lessons from
CHSRA’s experiences:
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• Legislative Support is important: Once political support has been secured it should
be quickly solidified with some form of written legislation at the state level, as political
climates change frequently.
• Work hard to maintain support from all the branches of government, especially the
legislature and executive. Any support gained must be continuously nurtured. Even
with a legislative mandate and a shovel-ready project with almost 80 percent of
federal funds, the Florida Orlando-to-Tampa project was still killed by a change in
leadership that was opposed to the project.
• Continuously work to keep project studies going even when funding is low or
prospects appear dim. In this sense, the approach adopted by California to have an
authority made up of five members provided a low-cost body to manage the early
stages of the project.
• It is also crucial to build support with stakeholders in the community, as they are
indispensable advocates in generating support from the public.
• Lastly, large-scale projects like HSR will always negatively impact some members
of the community and the environment. Mitigating and managing the impacts on
affected communities and the environment is not a trivial task. Next to political leaders,
impacted communities can be one of most likely agents to derail a project. The
‘outreach’ to these communities needs to be managed carefully, and transparency
is needed to gain the trust of those affected.
HSR has several benefits, but given the costs, careful planning, credible evaluation of
the project and experienced managers are needed to handle such huge multibillion-dollar
investments that involve substantial amounts of taxpayers’ money.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ARRA
CHSRA
DOT
FHWA
FRA
HSR
ISTEA

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
California High-Speed Rail Authority
Department of Transportation
Federal Highway Administration
Federal Railroad Administration
High-Speed Rail
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
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